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ABSTRACT ^— / CA 9394o- ]01
This thesis investigates the effects of the Thai financial crisis on the Thai military
from the fiscal budget allocation aspect. The thesis explores the changes in the
expenditure reduction pattern during four years of the recent financial crisis in Thailand.
The thesis finds that the budget allocation in Thailand follows the historical expenditure
reduction pattern found by Norman L. Hicks. The defense budget bears a high burden
from the fiscal budget reduction during the financial crisis as found in the Hicks' study.
This budget allocation pattern creates short-term and long-term effects on the Thai
military. The short-term effects mainly come from the real term reduction in the defense
budget, while the long-term effects draw from the decline in defense budget as a
proportion of the GNP and the central government budget, in addition to the decline in
the GNP. These effects deteriorate the capability, readiness, and the modernization
process of the Thai armed forces. The thesis concludes that the effects of the Thai
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After a generation of the intensive development in the late 1980s to the early
1990s, Thailand appeared on the top rank of the newly industrialized countries. Thailand
retained one of the highest growth rate countries in the world from 1985 to 1994 (8.2
percent annualized GDP). 1 Thai economy mainly depended on exports of manufactures
(high-technology goods) and the development in the service sectors. On the other hand,
most of Thailand's imports had been for capital equipment and raw materials. The
imports for consumer goods were beginning to rise in the beginning of the 1990s. In
general, country benefited from rising investment from abroad while Thailand's 35
percent domestic savings rate was a key source of capital for the economy.2
The Thai economy started to slow down in 1996 as the growth rate fell from 8.7
percent in 1995 to 6.4 percent in 1996. This slowdown raised the questions about
whether the country could continue to grow by counting on the easy gains of the past.
Thai traditional labor-intensive industries began to face on the high competition from
neighboring countries such as Vietnam and China. In addition, the serious financial
infrastructure problems such as the over investment in the property sector brought many
financial firms to the brink of insolvency. The frauds in the financial institutions and
political turmoil pushed the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) index down from 1415 in
1
U.S. Department of Commerce- National Trade Data Bank, Thailand: Economic Trends and Outlook,
1998, p. 1.
" World Fact Book 1997, Thailand: Economy, Available [Online]: <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/country-frame.html> [27 Dec. 1998].
February 1 996 to around 800 by the end of the year. Over forty percent of stock index
decreased. It was set as the worst performance in Asia in that year. 3
For the Thai people, the illusions of prosperity from the high economic growth in
the early of the 1990s still covered in their minds. Thai businesses still enjoyed the large
amount of foreign loans in the non-foreign-currency generated investments such as the
big project of infrastructure and real estate, while the current account deficit began to
wide considerably. In July 1997, the bubble economy burst — the collapse of the Thai
Baht. The Thai people faced the financial rough time: the economic recession, the
devaluation of the baht, the fluctuations of exchange rate and domestic interest rate. Thai
government finally asked for the IMF's assistance and worked closely under IMF's
recovery plan in order to alleviate this crisis.
Although the news and economic analysis about the financial situation in
Thailand were worldwide publicized before and after of the economic burst, a clear
economic situation did not show up in both government and private sector. Moreover,
Thai people were clouded under the illusions of non-floating baht policy from Prime
Minister Chavalit Youngchaiyudh, "we will never devalue the baht". 4 So, when the bath
was floated, the severe impacts from the eruption of the financial crisis immediately
spread widely and deeply through the whole country. It was clearly that this crisis did
not only shock to Thai business sector but also stunned to the government agents.
For the Thai military, in order to maintain its readiness, a planner needs to be able
to assess the prospects for funding new and remaining programs. What is the effect on
3
U.S. Department of Commerce- National Trade Data Bank, p. 2.
Financial Times, Timetable: Countdown to crisis, January 13, 1998, p. 1.
the military from this situation? Moreover, how does the military deal with this
situation?
B RESEARCH SCOPE
Today, the financial crisis that originated in Thailand is the global. It crates the
large impacts in the world economy and also reimpacts to Thailand. Therefore, it is too
difficult to simplify the financial crisis situation and its effects in every aspect. In this
research, many aspects of the financial crisis were omitted in order to maintain the ability
to focus on the effects of the Thai financial crisis on military in the fiscal budget
adjustment's point of view. This thesis will pay attention only on the financial crisis in
Thailand from 1995 to 1999, and will examine the related data based on the public
information.
C. METHODOLOGY
This research will review the Thai financial crisis and the implementation of Thai
governmental recovery plan in order to generate a clear picture of upcoming situation in
the fiscal budget stance. Then, this research will examine the fiscal budget adjustment of
Thailand during the financial crisis by comparing to the study of expenditure reduction
during the debt crisis in the 1970s-80s by Norman L. Hicks in order to draw potential
fiscal budget adjustment. Finally, This thesis will draw the conclusion from the
upcoming financial situation and the potential proportion of defense budget to the effects
of the Thai military.
The methodology used in this thesis is a literature review on economy and policy
aspects from archival research, as well as, a literature search of books, magazine article,
Internet articles and other information sources in order to provide the appropriate frame
of reference and information. Then, all information will be evaluated in order to analyze
the effects of the Thai financial crisis on the military.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter I is the general introduction, scope, and guideline of the thesis. In
Chapter II, the thesis will give the overview of the financial crisis in Thailand, the
recovery plan, and its implementation. The conclusion of this chapter will focus on the
trend of the fiscal budget policy under the facing financial problems in Thailand. Chapter
HI presents the study of Norman L. Hicks from Strategic Planning and Review
Department of the World Bank in the expenditure reduction in developing countries. The
argument that Hicks noticed, in the behavior of the countries' adjustment expenditure
during the debt crisis in the 1907s-80s, will be used as reference to compare to Thai fiscal
budget adjustment in order to draw the potential fiscal budget adjustment and defense
budget adjustment. In the fourth chapter, the thesis will present the analysis of the effects
of the financial crisis on the Thai military in short-term and long-term effects. This
chapter will start with the introduction of the Thai military, then the conclusion of
Chapter II (the fiscal budget adjustment policy) and Chapter III (the potential proportion
of defense budget) will be used to draw the effects on the military. Finally, the overall
picture of the research from Chapter I to IV will be presented in the last chapter, Chapter
V- conclusions.
II. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THAILAND
A. BACKGROUND OF THE THAI FINANCIAL CRISIS
1. The Situation Before the Crisis
In the early of the 1990s, the Thai economy grew at a rapid pace with growth
rates ranging from 8 percent to 12 percent per year. 5 The government annual budgets
were surplus every year. The government's revenues were fueled by growing economy.
Thailand was regarded internationally as a success case; a model for less developed
countries to follow.
6
Domestic and international investors had high confidence in Thai
economic fundamentals.
During this period, Thai currency, the baht, had been pegged to a basket of
currencies of the principle trading partners. The baht was tied closely to the U.S. dollar
(80 percent weight to U.S. dollar, 12 percent to Japanese Yen, and 8 percent to Deutsche
mark) while the domestic interest rates were higher than U.S. interest rates.7 Furthermore,
the liberalization of foreign-currency-account transactions and the introduction of the
Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) in 1993 also facilitated the capital inflow.
All of these factors raised the net capital inflows from about 8.1 percent of GDP in 1990
to 18 percent of GDP in 1995. These capital inflows expedited the country's ability to
grow by allowed the private sector to finance their investment projects at much lower
interest rates than domestic interest rates. Moreover, a risk from exchange rate was not
seriously determined because the baht was tied closely to the U.S. dollars. For the Thai
5 The Bank of Thailand, Thailand's Macroeconomics Indicators, Available [Online]: < http://www.bot.





U.S. artment of Commerce-National Trade Data Bank, p. 8.
government, the foreign reserves were increasing rapidly from 16.5 billion dollars in 1990
to 46.5 billion dollars in 1995 in order to cover the rapid sky-high short-term debt and add
the confidence in the strength of the Thai economy.
2. The Transition Period
While Thailand enjoyed high economic growth in the first half of the 1990's, the
large capital inflow led the country's outstanding external debt. The total outstanding
external debt rose from 28.8 billion dollars in 1990 (33.8 percent of GPD) to 90.5 billion
dollars at the end of 1996 (50.9 percent of GDP). 9 Almost all of the increasing debts
were generated by the private sector in the short-term debt (maturity of one year or less).
The ratio of short-term debt increased from 35.5 percent in 1990 to 55.6 percent in 1995,
and the ratio of short-term debt to foreign reserve rose from 0.6 in 1990 to 1.0 in 1995.
For debt management, in the government sector, the fiscal budget was in surplus
every year in the first half of the 1990s. Thai government had an effective management
system to control the size and maturity structure of public sector debt. However, in the
private sector, the lack of sufficient discipline in debt management was found in many
aspects such as loans that greatly exceeded from firm's capital, lack of consideration in
risks from exchange rate, too much short-term borrowings to finance long term projects,
and the over-investment in the non-generate foreign exchange (such as infrastructure and
real estates).
Furthermore, Thai business gradually lost its competitiveness. The strength of
U.S. dollar in mid-1990s caused the baht to become over-valued, while Thai inflation rate
was consistently higher than the U.S. inflation rate. Thai total export declined by 0.2
8 The Bank of Thailand. Thailand's Macroeconomics Indicators.
percent compared to increasing over 20 percent per year in prior years. Imports, on the
other hand, grew at 2.3 percent. This imbalance in export and import pushed the trade
deficit up from 15.0 billion dollars in 1995 to 16.5 billion dollars in 1996. 10 The lost of
Thai competitiveness also raised the current account deficit from 13.5 billion dollars in
1995 to 14.7 billion dollars in the following year. The confidence of the international
financial market in the Thai economy was degraded by all of these factors.
In 1996-1997, speculators started to attack against the value of baht again and
again. The foreign reserves were sharply declined from supporting the value of baht
against speculative attacks, while the net capital flows became highly negative. The
financial situation in Thailand, finally, went to the critical point after the Bank of
Thailand (BOT) used a vast amount of foreign reserves to defend the baht against
speculative attacks in November 1996, in February 1997, and in May 1997. The foreign
reserves dropped from 33 billion dollars in the beginning of the year to mere 2.5 billion
dollars at the end of June 1997. 11 This defense of the Thai currency reduced the foreign
reserves lower than the outstanding short-term debt position of the country. Ultimately,
on July 2, 1997, the government of Thailand decided to let the baht float in the currency




U.S. Department of Commerce - National Trade Data Bank, p. 10.
B. THAI ECONOMIC RECOVERY PLAN
1. The Initial Recovery Plan
The economic recovery package came out from the close cooperation between
Thai government and IMF. The recovery plan first aimed to speedily stabilize the Thai
economy, and then to solve the financial infrastructure problems comprehensively in
order to put the Thai economy back to stable growth path. The programs of action were
divided into two parts: the immediate and medium-term phase.
First, the immediate phase was designed to deal with the macro-economic
stabilization and the financial sector reformation. The macro-economic stabilization
policies mainly targeted to improve the fiscal balance, to ensure an appropriate level of
surplus by raising revenue and reducing expenditure. On the monetary policy, it
concerned with tight monetary and exchange rate policies. These policies were required
until situations in the exchange market and capital inflows were stable. Finally, on the
financial restructuring, the recovery plans focused on the restoration of pubic confidence
on the financial institution and restructure of the financial management. The objectives
and recovery actions in the immediate phase were showed in Table 1
.




to shift the consolidated
public sector deficit into a
surplus of 1 percent of
GDP in 1997/98,
to support the necessary
improvement in the large
current account deficit,
- to cover the interest costs
Increasing revenue by raise
taxes such as value-added tax
from 7 percent to 10 percent.
A cut down in planned
government budget of the fiscal
year 1998 which is previously
set at 923 billion baht to 801
billion baht in October 1997.
Ensuring an adequate
11
Siamwalla, Ammar, Can a Developing Democracy Manage its Macroeconomy? : The Case of Thailand,
Thailand Development Research Institute, Available [Online]: <http://www.info.tdri.or.th/newbook
.htm>r26 Dec. 19981.
of financial restructuring. availability of credit to help
foster an economic recovery
Monetary policy A temporary tightening of Expenditure switching through
monetary policy to stem weaker exchange rates in order
exchange rate depreciation to also help the current account
Structure a framework of deficit
the new managed float
regime
Financial sector identification and close of Closing 58 financial
restructuring un-viable financial institutions.
institution, Establish the Financial Sector
Intervention to the weakest Restructuring Authority (FRA)
banks and the as an independent agency
recapitalization of the authorized to take care of
banking system. suspended financial institutions.
Structural reforms to Establishing the Asset
remove features of the Management Corporation
economy that had become (AMC), an independent agency
impediment to growth, responsible for purchasing
such as monopolies, trade deteriorated assets from
barriers. nonrecovered financial
institutions and managing and
selling those assets in the future.
Establishment of a specific
timetable for implementing
financial sector restructuring,
including strategies for the
preemptive recapitalization and
strengthening of the financial
system.
Privatization four banks in
which the political authorities
had intervened.
Legal Amendment Legislative amendment in
to facilitate corporate Bankruptcy Law.
rehabilitation and debt - Foreclosure proceedings
restructuring legislation.
to streamline court process
for settlement of debt
claims
Table 1: T le Objectives and Recovery Actions in the Immediate Phase
Second phase, the medium-term phase was designed to improve efficiency and to
enhance competitiveness of industry. The action plans involved in increasing efficiency
of state enterprises by the privatization to private sector investment and operation as well
as improving efficiency of the public sector via civil service reform. Moreover, the
action plans also included the industrial restructuring plan in order to enhance the export
competitiveness of Thai products in the world market.
The fund that came together with the recovery package was approved by the IMF
in a 17.2 billion-dollar stand-by credit loan. This loan was divided into twelve
withdrawals. Each withdrawal was made roughly in every three months after approval
the evaluations of situation by the IMF Board of Executive Directors. 12 The step by step
adjustments of IMF recovery package was done a long with the changing financial
situation as indicated in the Letter of Intention (LOI). Nowadays (March 1999), Thai
recovery plan was implemented under the sixth LOI.
2. Situation After the Initial Recovery Plan
a. The Downturn Period (LOI #1 - #3, Julyl997 - May 1998)
The economic recovery package under the cooperation of IMF that started in
August 1997 had failed to rebuild investor confidence as initially expected. The capital
outflows continued unchecked in the first quarter, as international investors and financial
institutions called back loans and sought to limit country and regional exposures. The
value of the baht remained decreasing (Figure 1 ). Moreover, the increasing of political
and economic uncertainties in the region such as the chaos in Indonesia and Malaysia
12
The Ministry of Finance, The Letter of Intent Number Six, Available [Online]: < http://www.mof.
go.th/loi6/ loi6mainE. htm > [5 Jan. 1999].
10
also damaged the Thai economy. They led many investors to pull out of the region and
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Figure 1: Thailand Exchange Rate as Bahts per one U.S. Dollar (1997-98)
The tight fiscal and monetary policies that planed to restore the confidence and
some balances in external accounts ruined on the domestic economy. Short-term interest
rates jumped sharply higher. Weak finance companies and commercial banks continued
to turn to the central bank's Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) for liquidity
support. A credit slowdown was inevitable, given deteriorating asset quality and
prospects for the economy overall. Companies with state contracts and concessions also
fell into liquidity difficulties as public agencies held back payments in a bid to remain
within the government's austerity guidelines.
As a result of the depression from the tight fiscal and monetary policies, the
government and the IMF agreed to relax fiscal policies in the third LOI that effected from
February through May 1998. Instead of a 1- percent surplus target, the 1998 budget
11
would instead aim at a deficit of no more than 2 percent of GDP. However, an easing in
fiscal policies did little to prevent the slide in domestic economic activity in the
beginning. Production and manufacturing indices slid to historical lows. Moreover,
imports collapsed nearly 17 percent in the second quarter in 1998, compared with the















Figure 2: Current Account Ql-1997 to Q3-1998
Nevertheless, during this down turn period (Q3-97 to Q2-98), the current account
jumped sharply, with the estimation at 118.1 billion bahts in surplus or about 11 percent
of GDP (Figure 2). 14 This surplus mainly came from the import side rather than export
side (Figure 3). The import value downed 32 percent, while export value decreased by
3.1 percent. The current inflows helped stabilize the baht in a range of 40-42 bahts to a
dollar, while falling demand and depressed world commodities prices helped restrain
inflation at rate 8.5 percent.
3 Bank of Thailand, Economic Research Department, Table 42. Balance ofPayments, 16 February 1999,
















Figure 3: Import and Export Volume
b. The Upturn Period (LOI #4 - #6, August 1998 - present)
The up-turn period began from the stability of the baht at around 40 baht to
dollar. The eased monetary and fiscal policies were widely agreed from the IMF and
Thai government in the fourth LOI in the late May 1998. The fiscal deficit target was
increased to 3 percent of GDP from 2 percent. Money supply growth for the year was
increased to 9 percent from the 5. 1 percent target set out previously. Market interest rates
also began to ease. As depositor confidence returned to the financial system, demand for
liquidity from the Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) dropped.
For the foreign reserve situation, although the total sum of external debt did
not change much, its composition changed markedly. Short-term private debt decreased
by 25 percent (34.3 to 25.9 billion dollars). Reserve / private short-term debt ratio has
increased from 0.79 in 1997 to 1.1 in 1998.
The government's financial restructuring programs that have been the
cornerstone in the recovery program actually began in the fifth LOI (August to November
13
1998). The government closed five finance companies and two small banks. A 3000-
billion-baht recapitalisation program for the remaining banks and finance companies was
issued to strengthen the finance institution situation. Moreover, a number of direct
measures have also been taken to revive the financial institution situation such as
providing externally-financed credit facilities, especially for small industries, and
exporters, removing tax disincentives to corporate debt restructuring; and restructuring
the borrowing operations of the Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF).
Nowadays, under the sixth LOI, the financial conditions have continued to
improve. The strength of market confidence has extended beyond the exchange rate to
declining interest rates, a rise in the stock market index. The government intends to
continue implementing the expansionary fiscal budget to stimulate the domestic demand
and spending. Moreover, this policy will alleviate the redundant labor force problem in
the short term.
C. FISCAL BUDGET ADJUSTMENT IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
1. Fiscal Budget Adjustment Policy
At the time of the financial crisis eruption, Thai government announced the
budget cut under the tight fiscal and monetary policy as a part of the austerity under the
IMF-led loan package. Generally, the fiscal budget adjustment policy intended to ensure
the quality of public welfare and the development of human resource. The education,
health, and essential infrastructure projects were protected. 15
15 The Royal Thai Government, Policy Statement, 20 November 1997, Available [Online]: < http://www.
thaigov.go.th/em-pol.htm > [27 Dec. 1998].
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Although, later on, the fiscal budget policy was changed to expansionary budget
policy, the Cabinet remained approving the FY 99 fiscal budget based on the thriftiness.
Thai government announced to decrease a large amount of consumption and less
productive spending such as in general administration and defense. Moreover, the fiscal
budget policies intended to eliminate the expenditure on the low-priority projects such as
unnecessary remuneration, outdoor conferences and temporary employee wage. Finally,
the projects with high import contents and foreign currency spending, such as military
arms, overseas seminars and conferences, durable goods imports and unnecessary
computer hardware, needed to postpone.
2. The Expansionary Budget Allocation
The expansionary budget policy began implementing in May 1998 by increasing
the deficit fiscal budget target from 2 percent to 3 percent of GDP. The increasing deficit
budget 1 percent of GDP, that equaled 50 billion bahts, was borrowed from treasury
reserves. The 50 billion bahts in government spending was broken down into 10 billion
for state enterprises and the remaining 40 billion bahts in extra budgetary accounts for the
central budget.
State enterprises invested the 10 billion baht portion in various projects such as
funds for ongoing infrastructure projects by the Electricity Generating Authority of
Thailand and projects by the Petroleum Authority of Thailand.
The extra 40 billion bahts in the central budget were allocated into five parts.
First, the 27 billion bahts (54 percent of increasing money in the expansionary policy)
was applied to the authorized programs that the budget had been cut in the previous year
due to the declining of state revenues. Then, the 4.751 billion bahts covered the
15
government's outstanding obligations to the Social Welfare Fund. An additional 3.19
billion bants settled the accumulated losses in 1995-1996 from the Bangkok Mass Transit
Authority. Additionally, social welfare, health services, and hospital costs for the civil
service received 4.7 billion bahts. Finally, the Government Pension Fund received 0.282
billion bahts in overdue contributions.
For FY 1999, the overall public sector deficit was targeted at about 5 percent of
GDP, higher than our previous target by about 2 percent of GDP (the interest costs of
financial restructuring are estimated at 3 percent of GDP). Furthermore, the government
plans to use foreign financing, about 1 percent of GDP, to support specific spending
projects directed toward social safety net and related labor-intensive investment projects.
The government will also continue to accelerate the disbursement of budgetary and non-
budgetary expenditures.
The outlook for the government budgets for the FY 2000, beginning on October
1, 1999, was expected to be in deficit with the total expenditure around 900 billion bahts.
The government still assumes the role to stimulate the economy through government
spending.
D. THE CONFRONTING PROBLEMS
The structural weakness of the financial system has been at the heart of the
financial crisis. Under the recovery plan, a succession of measures has been introduced
to address these weakness and restructure the financial sector, such as the requirement for
financial institutions to raise capital in six banks and twelve finance companies and the
16
measure to deal with the unsuccessful firms in raising new capital by closing 58 financial
companies.
However, the combination of the accumulation of non-performing loans (NPLs),
the recapitalization of financial, and firms and corporate debt restructuring in the private
sector were still being the confronting problems. The NPLs had jumped to around 40
percent of total outstanding credit in the financial institution system. 16 Moreover, as a
result of rising non-performing loans, the pace of recapitalisation, strict regulations on
loan classification and provisioning, commercial banks continued to pursue a
conservative credit extension policy (frozen new loans). At the same time, although the
minimum lending rates were cut to the level around 10.5-11.5 percent, the lack of
confidence in economic recovery plan still made the investors reluctant to go for the new
investments.
These financial restructure problems coped with the deteriorating regional
economic environment crated adversary impacts to the domestic investment. The
manufacturing production, private consumption, and exports in U.S. Dollar terms
dropped at a slower pace.
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
The first half of IMF recovery fund was passed, while the rest will end in the next
18 months. Thai government made six out of twelve withdrawals from the IMF financial
package, in amount to U.S.$ 12.42 billion of the total U.S.$ 17.2 billion, to alleviate the
financial crisis in Thailand. Several measures were launched to tackle the economic
woes, and many of them worked so well. The value of baht became more stabilized,
17
throughout 1998. Foreign reserve resumed a more secured position according to the IMF
standard. On the other hand, the roots of the crisis in financial restructure and the NPLs
still challenged for the government to overcome in order to bring Thailand backs to the
economic growth track.
In the upcoming period, Thai government will probably have to continue its role
as a primary economic stimulator. The expansionary monetary and fiscal budget policies
will be used to stimulate the national productivity and export in dollar term in state
enterprises, as well as in the private sectors. Although, under these policies, the overall
budget in the next few years will be increased, the excess budgets tend to allocate more in
general government agencies and the infrastructure project in state enterprises, but not in
defense budget. The government remained approving the fiscal budget based on the
thriftiness. The governmental investment in non-productive, high import contents, and
high foreign currency spending areas tend to be continued postpone.
16 Bank of Thailand.
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ni. FISCAL BUDGET ADJUSTMENT IN THE THAI FINANCIAL CRISIS
In this chapter, the fiscal budget adjustment during the financial crisis will be
examined in order to find the potential pattern of the fiscal budget allocation of the
governments, especially on the defense budget. This paper will use Norman L. Hicks
17
study, Expenditure Reductions in Developing Countries Revisited, as a reference in
comparison to the fiscal budget adjustment pattern in Thailand.
A. EXPENDITURE REDUCTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY
NORMAN L. HICKS
1. Hicks' Study
In the study of Expenditure Reduction in Developing Countries, Hicks examined
the pattern of 24 developing country governments (Table 2) in expenditure reductions
under debt burden situation during the 1970s-80s. At that time, many developing
countries on hard times from the rising interest costs, higher prices for petroleum imports,










Argentina -25.0 Bolivia -5.0 Paraguay -11.9
Brazil -6.1 Chile -33.2 Tanzania -25.0
Chile -7.5 Costa Rica -33.4 Senegal -7.0
Dominican
Rep.
-16.2 Guyana -11.9 Togo -8.4
Haiti -14.2 Indonesia -14.0 Thailand -13.6
Liberia -45.1 Sri Lanka -15.2 Turkey -12.8
Morocco -12.0 Nicaragua -10.3 Uruguay -27.8
Malaysia -10.4 Venezuela 21.7 Zaire -53.2
Table 2: Countries Included in Expeiiditure Reduction Sample, IS•70-1984
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Development: Policy, Economics and International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 1, (New York: Wiley, 1991),
pp. 29-37.
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All of these circumstances had an adverse impact on the government revenues,
while the expended investment programs were financed with foreign debt. However, in
some case, the decline in oil prices after 1982 resulted in severe fiscal budget reduction in
the oil-exporting countries. The stabilization programs in debt crisis situation mostly
associated with debt and interest burden renegotiations. Furthermore, the recovery
programs often resulted in reductions of the governmental expenditures in order to reduce
the size of budget deficits without raising taxes, or passing the burden to tax payers by
higher taxes, reduction in capital and wage expenditures, or do in both ways.
In Hicks' study, he used the elasticity of expenditures in the specific
governmental budget sector as the indicator to explain the governmental expenditure
adjustment pattern. Where the elasticity of expenditure in the ith sector equals the
percentage change in expenditures in the ith sector (Xi) divided by the percentage change
in total expenditures (X). Governmental sectors that are favored in a period of reduction-
ei = Xi/X
(X<0) would have elasticity less than unity; that is, they would be expected to experience
reductions of less than average magnitude. However, it did not mean that these sectors
were protected from the reduction. On the other hand, a negative elasticity would
indicate that the sector managed to expend despite an overall reduction in expenditures.
Only if the elasticity is equal to zero, the sector is completely protected.
2. Empirical Evidence
In the empirical study, the governmental expenditures were aggregated into six
board sectors: general public sectors, defense, social sectors, productive sectors,
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infrastructure, and others. The general public sectors included police, justice and general
administrative expenditures. The social sectors included all expenditures on health,
education, housing, and other social services. The productive sectors contained
expenditures for industrial and agricultural development, while infrastructure sector
involved with power, transportation and communication subsections.
Hicks noticed from the empirical evidences that defense and social sectors might
have elasticity of less than one (relatively more protected sectors) while productive and
infrastructure sectors have elasticity greater than one (relatively less protected sectors).
Percentage Change Elasticity
Total Expenditure -17.2 1.00
General Public -9.2 0.53
Defense -6.25 0.38




Table 3: Expenditure Reduction and Elasticity by Sector in Sample Countries
For example, the data in Table 2 showed that defense expenditures were highly
protected. The elasticity of expenditure in defense sector was only 0.38. The general
service with an elasticity of 0.53 is the next most protected while the social sectors with
an elasticity of 0.66 are the following most protected. On contrary, infrastructure sector
seemed to bear a disproportionate share of the burden, with elasticity of 1.47. The
highest elasticity given for infrastructure may reflect the fact that these expenditures had
a high proportion of capital expenditures that were more vulnerable to reductions.
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3. Hicks' Argument
Hicks argued that the high-debt countries appeared to relatively well protect in
defense and the social sectors rather than infrastructure sector. The major burden of the
debt fell on the heavily capital-intensive sectors, particularly infrastructure sector. The
supported reasons in this pattern lay on the governmental efforts to preserve present
welfare and security interests by sacrificing long-term capital investment, and
consequently long-term output benefits. On the other hand, the actual expenditures were
not reduced in the high-debt countries. The rise in interest costs was greater than the
increase in revenues, so that non-interest expenditures were squeezed. Once again capital
expenditures and the infrastructure sector seemed to bear the brunt of the reduction. This
could have adverse consequences for long-term growth, and implied a passing of
adjustment burden on to future generations.
B. FISCAL BUDGET ADJUSTMENT IN THAILAND
1. Thai Fiscal Budget and Expenditure
In general, fiscal budget and governmental expenditure was the structure and
levels of financial resources that government allocated via the fiscal budget policy. The
fiscal budget indicated the intention of governmental resource allocation while the
expenditure showed the actual resource consumption. The governmental expenditure
might be more or less than the fiscal budget that approximated in the beginning of the
fiscal year. However, the expenditure/fiscal budget ratio also implied the ability of the
government to use its resources.
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In Thailand, the size of fiscal budget increased around 17 percent annually in the
first half of the 1990s. It still raised at double-digit rate until the financial crisis broke up
in 1997. When the Thai economy burst, the size of fiscal budget was around 944 billion



















1988 244,500 211,364 86.8 - -
1989 286,500 237,438 83.2 17.2 12.3
1990 336,508 280,840 83.5 17.9 18.3
1991 387,500 316,508 81.7 18.8 12.7
1992 460,400 385,781 83.8 21.6 21.9
1993 560,000 462,744 82.6 11.6 19.9
1994 625,000 511,937 81.9 14.4 10.6
1995 715,000 579,734 81.1 17.9 13.2
1996 843,200 670,277 79.5 12.0 15.6
1997 944,000 763,056 80.8 -12.1 13.8
1998 830,000 680,600* 82.0* -0.6** -10.8*
1999 825,000 676,500* 82.0* -0.6** -0.6*
* Approxirnate from average projection of exipenditure/fisca budget ratio 82.0percent
1 8
** Source from Government Spokesman
Table 4: Fiscal Budget and Expenditure of Thailand in the 1990s
1000 r
million bahts
—Fiscal Budget —S— Expenditure
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Figure 4: Fiscal Budget and Expenditure 1989-1999
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Although there were some fluctuations in the increasing rate of fiscal budget in
each year, the average expenditure / fiscal budget ratios in the 1990s were stable at level
around 82percent (Figure 4). Moreover, the ratio of fiscal budget and expenditure in each
governmental sector remained roughly in the same level. Therefore, in order to maintain
the ability to forecast and eliminate inaccessible expenditure information in FY 1998 and
FY 1999, the fiscal budget will be used to analyze the pattern of governmental fiscal
budget adjustment in comparison to the Hicks' governmental expenditure reduction
pattern.
2. Thailand's Fiscal Budget Adjustment Pattern
In general, Thai government allocates its fiscal budget into 19 sectors according
to ministries and key financial functions in the governmental administration (see
Appendix A: Thailand Fiscal Budget Allocation). During the economic boom period (FY
1990 - FY 1997), the largest portion of the fiscal budget was allocated to Ministry of
Education (MOE) on average around 15.8 percent, while the second largest portion fell
on the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in around 15.2 percent of the overall fiscal budget. On
the contrary, the smallest fiscal budget proportion took 0.4 percent of overall budget in
the Ministry of Commerce. The budget of Ministry of Defense (MOD) was the third
largest budget portion of the fiscal budget. It occupied around 13.7 percent during the
economic growth period. 19 After the eruption of the financial crisis in 1997, the fiscal
budget allocation in 1998 and 1999 were slightly changed. The three biggest fiscal
budget portions still remained in the same ministries (MOE, MOI, and MOD) while the
smallest budget proportion was in the Ministry of Foreign Affair (average 0.48 percent).
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The classification of fiscal budget based on Hicks' categories was exhibited in
Table 5 and the proportions of fiscal budget in each category in the 1990s were displayed
in Figure 5. It obviously showed that during the high economic growth period, the fiscal
budget in all categories also raised along with the economic growth. The general public
sectors took the largest proportion in the beginning of the 1990s (1991-1993) with
average proportion around 31.5 percent. However, it gradually dropped annually,
comparing to, the budget in the social sectors that took the second largest proportion of
fiscal budget during economic growth, and it gradually increased in portion up until now.
Only in the defense budget that the fiscal budget proportion gradually decreased during
economic boom at average rate - 4.5 percent and sharply reduced when economy burst
(Figure 5).
Budget and Expenditure Sector Budget Allocation Organization
Defense Ministry of Defense
Social sector Ministry of Labor and Welfare
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of University Affairs
General Public Sector Office of the Prime Minister
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Finance
Infrastructure Sector Ministry of Transportation and Communications
State Enterprises
Productive Sector Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
Ministry of Industry
Ministry of Science, Technology and
Environment
Ministry of Commerce
Others Others except Office of the Prime Minister
Fund and Revolving Capital
Central Fund
Table 5: Classification of Fiscal Budget Based on Hicks' Categories
9The Bank of Thailand: Economic data bank, Available [Online]: < http://www.mof.go.th/fiscal
/Fiscalmain.htm > [28 Dec. 1998].
25
% of fiscal budget
40
Defense Social sector General Public Infrastructure Productive
Sector Sector
Other
Figure 5: The Proportion of Fiscal Budget Based on Category in the 1990s
3. Elasticity of the Fiscal Budget
The examination of elasticity in Thai fiscal budget category showed that before
the financial crisis, the real term budgets in all categories were increased (expect the
fluctuation in others sector in 1996). The first two highest favor categories of this
increasing fell on the infrastructure sectors (e = 1.52 and 1.70) and the general service (e
= 1.64 and 1.03) while the defense fiscal budget increased in the lowest portion (e = 0.5
and 0.34)(Table 6).





















Defense 0.85 0.80 0.42 0.69 0.47 0.50 0.34 2.53 11.07
Social sector 1.66 1.10 0.93 1.71 0.85 1.38 0.96 -0.08 3.20
General
Public
0.14 0.62 0.92 0.22 0.12 1.64 1.03 1.77 -20.43
Infrastructur
e Sector
0.91 1.32 2.04 1.32 1.26 1.52 1.70 0.63 30.95
Productive
Sector
1.62 1.08 0.89 1.52 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.77 2.00
Others 2.21 1.71 1.47 1.01 3.60 -0.62 1.24 0.75 -0.88
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Figure 6: The Elasticity of Fiscal Budget
However, in the beginning of the financial crisis (FY 1998), the overall fiscal
budget declined 12.1 percent from the previous fiscal year. Clearly, the most burden of
this reduction fell on the defense budget (e = 2.53) and followed by the general public
sector and productive sector (e = 1.77). The social sector that comprised with budget on
health, education, housing and other social services was highly protected (e = -0.08).
However, in the second fiscal year under the financial crisis (FY 1999), the fiscal budget
adjustment policy dramatically changed from the tight monetary policy to the
expansionary policy.
Although the excess budgets from the expansionary policy were allocated in the
infrastructure sectors, the infrastructure sectors (e = 30.95), that included power,
transportation and communications, was changed from the protected sector in 1998 to
bear the most of the burden in 1999. Moreover, the defense budget (e - 1 1.07) also bore
the high burden of fiscal budget reduction in second rank. On the other hand, the highest
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protected sector was changed into in the general service (e = -20.43) that included police,
justice and general administrative budget. Furthermore, the budget in the others sector (e
=
-0.88), that included central fund, fund and revolving capital, and others, was the
second most protected sector.
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
In the financial crisis, the fiscal budget adjustment pattern of Thai government has
followed the Hicks' argument that in countries experiencing a decline in real government
expenditures defense budget and social sector was less vulnerable cut than infrastructure
expenditures. The major burden of the debt fell on the heavily capital-intensive sector,
particularly in the infrastructure sector while defense budget and social sector were
relatively less reduced.
Explicitly, in Thailand's case under the fiscal budget reduction, the infrastructure
budget appeared the largest reduction category. Moreover, the defense budget was the
second largest reduction category while the social sectors bore the third largest reduction.
The most protected category, on the other hand, was the general public sector (police,
justice and general administrative) and the others sector (central fund, fund and revolving
capital, and others except Office of the PM.) was the second most protected category.
Furthermore, this fiscal budget adjustment pattern trended to follow on the fiscal
budget allocation policy that Thai government announced in the recovery plan.
Generally, under the expensionary budget policy, the fiscal budget allocation intended to
stimulate the domestic productivity and the social welfare, while the governmental
investment in non-productive, high import contents, and high foreign currency spending
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areas were postponed. Thus, the majority of reduction budgets were loaded in
infrastructure and defense sectors.
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE THAI MILITARY
A. GENERAL ABOUT THE THAI MILITARY
In the last decade, the security situations in Southeast Asia changed dramatically
from the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Communist insurgency, to the
withdrawal of the U.S. military presence from the Philippines, and to the increasing
influence of China in South China Sea. The internal threats from the separatists and
external threat from unsettled boundary were changed to the dispute in the ownership of
natural resource in the sea. The Thai military, which played the major role in internal and
external security in the Thai society, is being modified and restructured in order to
respond in these changing situations.
The prosperity of the Thai economy, during the first half of the 1990s, advocated
the modernization of the Thai military. The Thai armed forces expanded their strengths
by enhancing their power-projection capabilities in the sea and air power. The Royal
Thai Army (RTA), the largest in manpower and the most influence in the Thai armed
forces, modernized its strengths though the advanced arms imports, modern education
and training as well as the computerized command and control system. The Royal Thai
Navy (RTN), the highest growth in military resources over the last decade, has expanded
its role from a traditional coastal patrol force to a fleet with blue-water operation. The
Navy purchased the region's first light aircraft carrier from Spain, six frigates and a fleet
replenishment ship from China. Moreover, a new naval dockyard was built, and five
corvettes and a number of patrol aircraft were commissioned. The naval personnel levels
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grow from 32,000 in 1980s to some 60,000 in 1995. 20 For the Royal Thai Air Force
(RTAF), the fourteen F-16As and four F-16Bs were the biggest project that purchased to
reinforce the air power.
Comparison to countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN):
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, and
Vietnam, in the mid 1990s, the Thai armed forces were the third largest forces in the
ASEAN in term of personal, following from Vietnam and Myanmar.21 In the defense
expenditure aspect, in FY 1995 the Thai armed forces had in the largest amount of
defense expenditure, following by the Indonesia armed force. Furthermore, in term of the
arms import, Thailand was ranked in the second largest arms import country in ASEAN
in 1996, after Indonesia's arms imports. Thailand's arms imports size was around 575
million dollars in 1996 (the twenty-first largest in the world). The major supplier country
of Thailand's arms imports was the United States (64 percent of arms imports from 1994-
1996). 22
B. DEFENSE BUDGET ALLOCATION
1. General
Under the inaccessible defense budget data circumstance, the defense
expenditures during 1970s- 1980s which were the actual defense spending—on average
around 82 percent of defense budget—will be used as a mirror of the historical data of
defense budget allocation to depict the general pattern of defense budget allocation in
20 SIPRI Yearbook 1995, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (Sweden: Oxford University
Press), 1995, p. 432.
21 World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer 1996, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Available [Online]: < http://www.acda.gov/wmeat96/wmeat96.htm> [11 March 1999].
/orld Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer 1997, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmame
Available [Online]: < http://www.acda.gov/wmeat97/wmeat97.htm> [11 March 1999].
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Thailand before the financial crisis. After that, in the financial crisis in 1997, the defense
budget allocation will be used to analyze.
During the 1970s-80s, although the defense expenditure as the percentage of gross
national product (GNP) and central government expenditure (CGE) were decreased in the
last three decades, the defense expenditure in the real term was increased. Thai defense
expenditure as the proportion of GNP slightly decreased from around 3 percent of GNP
in the 1970s-80s to around 2.6 percent in the beginning of the 1990s. Furthermore, the
defense expenditure as the proportion of CGE also decreased continuously. It declined
from around 20 percent of CGE in 1970s-80s to 15 percent in the mid-1990s (Figure 7).
However, in the real term, the defense expenditure grew on average 9.6 percent annually.
The size of defense expenditure before the eruption of the financial crisis in 1997 was
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Figure 7: Thai Armed Forces Resources 1972-1995
After the eruption of the financial crisis in 1997, the defense budget was sharply
decreased both in real terms and percentage of the central government budget (CGB).
The defense budget in real term reduced 20.64 percent from 104,093 in 1997 to 82,612
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million baths in 1998. The proportion of defense budget in total fiscal budget also
reduced from 11.25 percent in 1997 to 9.95 percent in 1998. Moreover in FY 1999, the
defense budget still had a trend of reduction both in real dollar term and as the percentage
of the fiscal budget. The defense budget in 1999 was 825,000 million bahts, 26 percent
less than the 1997 defense budget, while the portion of defense budget reduced to 9.39
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Figure 8: Defense Budget in Real Term
2. Armed Services Category
Thai defense budget mainly allocated to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). It was
divided into five departments: the MOD office, the Royal Guard, the Supreme Command,
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. In general, the Army received the biggest share
of defense budget around 46 percent, while the Navy and Air Force got around 20
percent. The others category that included the MOD office, the Royal Guard, and the
Supreme Command received around 14 percent of overall defense budget.
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Table 7: Defense Budget Categorized by Armed Services
This armed services budget proportion slightly changed during the financial crisis
(Table 7). The Army, Navy, and Air Force tend to get smaller share while the defense
budget was allocated more for the MOD office.
3. Operational Task Category
Classified by the operational task, the defense budget was divided into three
categories: the general administration budget (included salary, military construction, and
office administration), national defense budget (included operational budget,
maintenance, and weapons acquisition), and the others (included social service and aids
protection fund). When the defense budget was reduced, each category was cut in
different proportion (Figure 9). The main protected category was in the general
administration budget while the defense budget bore the majority of the burden in this
reduction. The proportion of the general administration budget was increased from 49.9
35
percent in 1995 to 63.0 percent in 1999 while the defense budget was reduced from 45.0
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Figure 9: Defense Budget Allocation in Operational Task Category
C. THE EFFECTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON MILITARY IN
THAILAND
1. The Short-term Effects
The financial crisis crated the direct and severe impacts to the Thai military. In
the macro-economic level, it was obviously that the defense budget bore the high burden
in the fiscal budget adjustment. The recovery packages under the expansionary policy
have little directly relevance to the defense budgets. The defense budget was decreased
both in real term and as the percentage of the overall fiscal budget.
In the micro-economic level, the defense budget in a part of the national defense
budget category (including the operational budget, maintenance and weapon acquisition
budget) got the main burden of budget reduction from the financial crisis. First from the
devaluation of the baht, almost all of the arms import and international training and
education were frozen in the first year of the crisis. Then, the budget allocation
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adjustments, the declining proportion in national defense category dramatically shrank
budget in real dollar term. These budget adjustments in the national defense budget
category deteriorated the presently military capability and readiness. In addition, these
budget reductions will hold back the military modernization process (Table 8).
Armed
Services
Proposed Arms Procurement Plan.
National
Defense
The 27-billion-baht military satellite project.
Army Planning to buy 50,000 M16-A2 assault rifles costing two billion bants
from the United States.
Replacement M41 and M48 tanks that have been in commission for
nearly 30 years cost around five billion bants.
Replacement WWII artillery and anti-aircraft guns; it costs around two
billion bahts.
Rebuild the engines of 100 Bell helicopters that have been in service for
20 years, worth four billion bahts
Acquisition 295 armored vehicles, worth five billion bahts.
Navy Proposal 17 billion bahts for two medium-sized submarines.
Planning to buy a fleet of light tanks for the Marines, worth five-billion-
bath.
Air Force Proposal 12 billion bahts to buy eight F/A-18 jets and computers for its
combat aircraft.
Table 8: Proposed Arms Procurement Plan23
2. The Long-term Effects
The defense resources allocation has directly effected from the national prosperity
as a whole. The national productivity sectors were dampened from the financial crisis
and still remained the facing problems for Thai government to solve. This decline in
national productivity coped with the historical reduction trend in defense resources as the
proportion of the nation resources and the fiscal budget allocation created negative effects
23 Nanuam, Wassana, Big budget hike soughtforforces: Army will get lion's share ofallocation,
Bangkokpost, 1 Jan. 1997, Available [Online]: <http://www.bkkpost. samart.co.th> [Dec. 1998].
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to the defense budget allocation in the long term. Although the defense budgets in the
real term may increase, the defense budget as the proportion of GNP and CGB tend to get
smaller.
These long-term effects will pressure the Thai armed forces to restructure their
organizations. The efficiency in organizational management is demanding under the
expansion of budget constraints. The roles and tasks of armed forces need to be adjusted
along with the declining proportion in the central government budget. The Thai military,
in general, will be modernized into the compact size. The command, control and
administration among armed services will be more centralized. The size of the military
in personnel (the largest military personnel armed forces in the ASEAN countries) will be
deceased in order to reduce the budget burden from manpower. Arms imports tended to
decrease while the new weapons will be used as standard arms in all armed services in
order to reduce the cost of maintenance and training. The high technology weapons are
required in order to reduce the operation cost. Finally, the military cooperation under the
cooperative security in the Southeast Asia region needs to develop in order to balance to




The eruption of the financial crisis in 1 997 created severe and deep damage to the
prosperity of Thailand's economy in both the private and governmental sectors. Thai
government, with the cooperation of IMF, applied both monetary and fiscal policy to
alleviate the economic situations. The initial tight budgetary policy was changed to an
expansionary policy to rebuild foreign investor confidence and stimulate the real
domestic productivity. However, the problems faced from the non-performing loans in
private sector, the financial restructure, and the domestic investment still remained the
huge challenges for government to solve.
This research found that Thai fiscal budget adjustment in this financial crisis was
following on the Hicks' expenditure reduction pattern. In the high debt countries, the
major burden of expenditure reductions fell on the heavily capital-intensive sector,
particularly in the infrastructure sector, while the defense and social sector were
relatively less reduced. For Thailand's case, the largest burden of budget reductions fell
on the infrastructure sectors while the defense sectors were the second.
This reduction pattern became more explicit in the defense budget category
whether in tight monetary budget policy or the expansionary budget policies. The
defense budget allocation still declined. The increasing in fiscal budget policy from the
expansionary fiscal budget policy had little direct effect on the defense budget. In the
micro-economic level, the Royal Thai Army, the largest portion of defense budget, bore
the largest burden in the budget reduction. Moreover, in the operation category, the
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national defense budget category that included operational budget, maintenance, and
weapons acquisition was the largest reduction category.
However, Thai defense budgets actually reduced in the proportion of GNP and
fiscal budget during the last three decades, but not in real terms. The defense budgets in
real terms increased to around 9.6 percent annually. The Thai military used these
increasing budgets to modernize its armed forces mainly by arms imports. The defense
budgets in real terms started to reduce after the eruption of the financial crisis, and the
defense budgets as a proportion of the fiscal budget continued to reduce. This real term
and proportion reduction from the financial crisis caused short-term and long-term effects
to military.
The short-term effects first came from the immediate impacts of the devaluation
of currency on the arms acquisition projects. The arms imports as well as international
training and education under the military modernization plan were postponed. Then, the
decline of defense budget allocation under the recovery policies also shrank the size of
defense budget. These budget reductions mainly went to the national defense budget
category that included operation, training, maintenance, and arms acquisition budget.
These shot-term effects from the financial crisis deteriorated the capability and readiness
of the military as well as hindered the military modernization process.
The long-term effects of the financial crisis on the Thai military depended on the
retrieval of the Thai economy in general. The defense budget in real term will increase
along with the economic growth. However, the share of defense budget in both GNP and
central fiscal budget still has the reduction trend.
40
Thus, viewed optimistically, the financial crisis was perceived as a booster that
forced the Thai military to reshape its structure under the upcoming budget constraint.
The roles and tasks of the armed forces need to be reviewed and adjusted along with the
decreasing proportion in the central fiscal budget. The Thai armed forces in the future
will be shaped in the compact size. The size of the military, in terms of personnel, will
be cut in order to reduce the manpower's budget burden, and the arms imports also tend
to decrease. The centralized management and administration under the advanced
command and control will be applied to reduce the fixed management cost. Furthermore,
the military cooperation under the cooperative security in the region needs to develop in
order to balance to the reducing military investment and the overall national security.
For the upcoming event, this study suggests that the Thai economy, in general,
will recover in the near future. Although, the Thai economy remained a huge debt
burden in private and government sectors, the lowest point of Thai economy had already
passed during the downturn period. The strong fundamental structure of national
productivity coped with the economic liberalization and the expansionary budget policies
will stimulate Thai economy back to the economic growth path. This upcoming economy
situation will alleviate the defense budget constraint situation. The short-term effects,
that directly dampen the capability and readiness of the military, will decline in their
impacts from the raising of the defense budget in the real term. However, in the long-
term effects, a share of the defense budget tends to get smaller.
Finally, this study shows that the elasticity of budget in the Hicks' expenditure
reduction pattern is explicit applicable to the Thailand financial crisis case. It shows the
generally predictable pattern of the fiscal budget adjustment in the high debt countries.
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Although, Hicks' empirical data mainly came from the debt burden in the government
sector, it also adapts in the case that the high debt burden mainly originated from the
private sectors, as in this case. This predictability pattern provides the essential cues on
how the government allocates its resources (fiscal budget) under the severe budget
constraints. Moreover, it also provides a picture of the potential defense budget
allocation that will help a planner to adjust the national security policy in general.
B. SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES
This research focused on the effects of the financial crisis on the Thai military
only in the fiscal budget adjustment point of view. Further studies in the relevant topics
can be done by considering other impacts on the Thai military, such as the effects on the
role of the armed forces in the political arena, the effects on military aids, and the effects
on the national and regional security. Moreover, further study can be done in the field of
developing a strategy to deal with budget reduction situations in the future.
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APPENDIX A. THAILAND FISCAL BUDGET ALLOCATION
Ministry 1989 1990 1991
Amount % Amount % Amount %
Total 285500 100 336508 100 387500 100
1 .Office of the
Prime Minister
2067 0.7 3281 1.0 3807 1.0
2.Ministry of
Defense
44427 15.6 52752 15.7 60588 15.6
3.Ministry of
Finance
68887 24.1 72563 21.6 61062 15.8
4.Ministry of
Foreign Affairs








14348 5.0 18379 5.5 20737 5.4
7.Ministry of
Commerce
764 0.3 1007 0.3 1255 0.3
8.Ministry of
Interior












2015 0.7 2930 0.9 5706 1.5
12.Ministry of
Education
40380 14.1 51935 15.4 63513 16.4
13.Ministry of
Public Health
11562 4.0 16521 4.9 20993 5.4
14.Ministry of
Industry








816 0.3 1484 0.4 1542 0.4
17. State
Enterprises




249 0.1 497 0.1 528 0.1
19.Central Fund 37265 13.1 26752 7.9 36273 9.4
Note: Amount: Millions Bants, based on 1997
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Ministry 1992 1993 1994 1995
Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount %
Total 460,0000 100 560,000 100 625,000 100 715,000 100
1 .Office of the
Prime Minister
5,773.8 1.3 5,735.3 1.0 5,808.4 0.9 7,000.3 1.0
2.Ministry of
Defense
71,398.6 15.5 78,625.2 14.0 85,423.9 13.7 91,638.8 12.8
3.Ministry of
Finance
62,388.0 13.6 66,702.4 11.9 62,561.7 10.0 49,373.7 6.9
4.Ministry of
Foreign Affairs








26,297.1 5.7 35,379.8 6.3 43,327.8 6.9 54,142.1 7.6
7.Ministry of
Commerce
3,003.5 0.7 3,305.2 0.6 2,348.7 0.4 2,944.4 0.4
8.Ministry of
Interior




0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6,673.8 1.1 8,323.7 1.2
lO.Ministry of
Justice





6,761.4 1.5 7,037.0 1.3 7,578.4 1.2 8,057.5 1.1
12.Ministry of
Education
75,024.8 16.3 88,177.2 15.7 100,486.0 16.1 110,657.8 15.5
13.Ministry of
Public Health
25,907.2 5.6 32,898.1 5.9 39,318.7 6.3 45,102.7 6.3
14.Ministry of
Industry








2,369.1 0.5 3,251.3 0.6 3,434.4 0.5 3,905.9 0.5
H.State
Enterprises




7,281.8 1.6 8,361.4 1.5 9,909.3 1.6 11,899.0 1.7
19.Central Fund 40,995.9 8.9 55,089.2 9.8 61,181.0 9.8 97,389.8 13.6
Note: Amount: Millions Bahts, based on 1997
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Ministry 1996 1997 1998 1999
Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount %
Total 843,200 100 944,000 100 830,000 100 825,000 100
1.Office of the
Prime Minister
8,111 0.96 8,188 0.87 6,684 0.81 7,126 0.90
2.Ministry of
Defense
100,611 11.93 104,093 11.03 82,612 9.95 77,445 9.40
3.Ministry of
Finance
49,031 5.81 50,040 5.30 42,862 5.16 74,866 9.10
4.Ministry of
Foreign Affairs








68,251 8.09 80,880 8.57 73,580 8.87 59,017 7.20
7.Ministry of
Commerce
4,059 0.48 4,059 0.43 3,812 0.46 4,047 0.50
8.Ministry of
Interior




10,742 1.27 12,088 1.28 10,000 1.20 11,116 1.30
lO.Ministry of
Justice
4,331 0.51 4,590 0.49 5,409 0.65 5,038 0.60




10,773 1.28 13,143 1.39 11,490 1.38 11,441 1.40
12.Ministry of
Education
136,725 16.22 141,972 15.04 153,341 18.47 151,579 18.40
13.Ministry of
Public Health
56,126 6.66 66,544 7.05 62,625 7.55 56,621 6.90
14.Ministry of
Industry








4,705 0.56 4,925 0.52 4,686 0.56 4,460 0.50
17.State
Enterprises




13,360 1.58 22,115 2.34 20,816 2.51 22,110 2.70
19.Central Fund 82,621 9.80 85,752 9.08 78,589 9.47 78,071 9.50
Note: Amount: Millions Bahts, based on 1997
Source: Ministry of Finance24
24
Ministry of Finance, Fiscal budget 1996-1999, Available [online] <http://www.fpo.mof.gp.th/other2/
quaterl-41AT8.htm> [27 Dec. 1998].
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APPENDIX B. THAILAND ARMED FORCES
1. ARMED FORCES









Light Tank Scorpion 154
Stingray 106
RECCE Shorland Mk3 32
APC M-113 340
V-150 Commando 150
PRC type 85 450







MOR 81 mm, 107 mm









































64,000 included 1,300 Naval Air, 18,000 Marines, Coastal




East Thai Gulf, 2nd West Thai Gulf, 3rd Andaman Sea
1 Naval Air Division
Bangkok, Sattahip (Fleet HQ), Songkhla, Phang Nga,
Nakhon Phanom (HQ Mekong River Operating Unit)
1 Helicopter carrier
12
1 Naressuan class: with 2*4 Harpoon SSM, 8 cell Sea
Sparrow SAM, l-127mm gun, 6-324mm TT, 1-SH-2F hel.
2 Chao Phraya (PRC Jianghu III type): with 8-C801 SSM,
2*2
-100mm guns, 2*5 ASW RL
2 Kraburil (PRC Jianghu /Vtype): with 8-C801 SSM, 1*2
-100mm guns, 2*5 ASW RL and Bell 212 hel.
2 Phutthayotfa Chulalok (U.S. Knox): with 8 Harpoon
SSM, 8 ASROC ASTT, 1- 127mm gun.
1 Makut Rajakumarn: with 2*3 ASTT (sting Ray LWT), 2-
1 14mm guns
2 Tapi (U.S. PF-103) with 2*3 ASTT, (Mk 46 LWT)
2 Tachin (U.S. Tacoma): with 2*3 ASTT













9- Harrier (6 AV-8, 3 TAV-8)
2- P-3T Orion, 1-UP-3T, 6 Do-228, 5 F-27 MPA, 5-
N24A Seaechmaster, 4 S-2F.
7- Bell 212 ASW




















1 1 -Cossna T-337 Skymasters, 14 A-7E, 4 TA-7C
1 Hel sqn with 7 Bell 212, 4 Bell 214, 4 UH-1H, 6
S-76N
AGM-84 Harpoon (for F-27 MPA)






3 ( 1 with 7 F-5A, 4 F-5B, 2 with 36 F-16)
2 sqn with 36 F-5E, 6 F-5F
7 sqn, 1 with 7 AC-47, 3 with 24 AU-23A, 2 with
30 OV-10C, 1 with 20 N-22B Missionmaster
1 sqn with 3 IAI-201
4 RF-5A, 3 RT-33A
2 Learjet 35A, 3 Merlin IVA, 3 GAF N-22B
Normads
3 sqn
1 with 6 C-130H, 6 C-130H-30, 3 DC-8-62F
1 with 3 C-122-K, 4 Bae-748
1 with 6 G-222
1 Airbus A-3 10-324, 1 Boeing 737-200, 1 King Air
200, 2 BAE-748, 3 Merlin IV, 2 Bell 412
24 CT-4, 30 Fantrainer-400, 16 Fantranier-600, 16
SF-260, 10 T-33A, 20 PC-9, 6-C, 1 1 T-41, 35 L-
39ZA/MP.
Source: The Military Balance 1996/1997. The International Institute for Strategic Studies.




Bangkokpost. The Economy: Economic Review Year-End 1997. 30 Apr. 1998. Available
[Online] <http:///www.bangkokpost.com .htm> [26 Dec. 1998].
Bank of Thailand: Economic Research Development. Thailand's Macroeconomic
Indicators. 1998. Available [Online] <http://www.bot.co.th> [27 Dec. 1998].
, Economic data bank. Available [Online]: <http://www.mof.go.th/fiscal
/Fiscalmain.htm> [28 Dec. 1998].
. Table 42. Balance of Payments. 16 Feb. 1999. Available [Online]:
<http://www.bot.or.th/research/public/bulletin/tab42.htm> [1 Mar. 1999].
Composition of Fiscal Adjustment is Critical to its Long-Term Success, IMF Survey, Jan.
1997.
Clements, Benedict, Sanjeev Gupta, and Jerald Schiff. What happened to the Peace
Dividend? Finance & Development. Mar. 1997.
Cronin M., Patrick, and Emily T. Metzgar. ASEAN and Regional Security. Institute for
National Strategic Studies-Strategic Forum. October 1996.
Cronin P., Richard. An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy Interests and Options: Asian
Financial Crisis. The McKEEVER Institute. Nov. 1997. Available [Online] <
http://www.mkeever.com > [27 Dec. 1998].
Crouse, Maurice. Citing Electronic Information in History Papers. Department of
History, The University of Memphis. 22 Oct. 1997. Available [Online]:
<http://www.people.memphis.edu/~mcrouse/elcite.html> [Dec. 1998].
Dupuy N., Trevor, Col., USA (Ret.), International Military and Defense Encyclopedia,
Brassey's (U.S.), Inc., 1993.
Eggert, James, Invitation to Economics, 1991. (California: Bristlecone,1991).
Fischer, Stanley,, In Defense of the IMF: Specialized tools for a specialized task, Foreign
Affairs, 1998, p.2.
Gillis, Malcolm, Dwight H. Perkins, Michael Roemer, and Donald R. Snodgrass.
Economics ofDevelopment. New York: Wiley, 1996.
Hicks L., Norman. Expenditure Reductions in Developing Countries Revisited, Journal of
International Development. New York: Wiley, 1 99 1
.
51
Krugman ,Paul, Why did Asia crash? : Disaster has spawned a new theory offinancial
crisis, The Economist: Finance and Economics, 1998. p. 66.
Lindert, Peter H., and Thomas A. Pugel. International Economics. (New York: 1996).
Luwell, Julia, Richard C. Neu, and Daochi Tong. Financial Crises and Contagion in
Emerging Marget Countries. (Washington, D.C: RAND: National Security Research
Division, 1998).
Mackenzie A., George, and David W.H. Orsmond. The quality offiscal adjustment and
growth, Finance & Development. 1996. Available [Online]
http:///www.worldbank.org/fanddVenglish/0696/articles/0 1 20696.htm.> [6 Dec.
1998].
Martinez Ortiz, Guillermo. What lessons does the Mexican Crisis hold for recovery in
Asia? Finance & Development. Jun. 1998.
McDermott C, John, and Robert F. Wescott. Fiscal reform that work, Economics, IMF,
1997.
Nanuam, Wassana. Big budget hike sought for forces: Army will get lion's share of
allocation. Bangkokpost. 1 Jan. 1997. Available [Online]: <http://www.bkkpost.
samart.co.th> [Dec. 1998].
Punyaratabandhu, Suchitra. Thailand in 1997: Financial Crisis and Constitutional
Reform. Asian Survey: Vol. XXXVIII (Feb. 1998) p. 162.
Q&A on Thailand's Road to Recovery. Bank of Thailand: Board of Investment.
September 1997. Available [Online] < http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/Thailand_
2.htm > [Oct. 1998].
Reducing unproductive expenditures is important for fiscal adjustment. IMF Survey.
February 1997.
Siamwalla, Ammar. Can a Developing Democracy Manage its Macroeconomy? The case
of Thailand. Thailand Development Research Institute. 1997. Available [Online]:
<http://www.info.tdri.or.th/newbook.htmp> [26 Dec. 1998].
SIPRI Yearbook 1997. Stockholm International Peace Research Institution. Oxford
University Press. 1997.
Taylor G., Robert. Asia Emerges From Crisis. International Economic Scoreboard: Long-
term Outlook, 1998.
Thai Armed Force Ready for Peace or Peacekeeping. Asian Defence Journal. No.
418/10/96, Oct. 1997. pp. 8-24.
52
Thailand: Economic Policy Analysis. The McKeever Institute of Economic Policy
Analysis. Available [Online]: <http://www.mkeever.com/thailand.html> [Dec.
1998].
Thailand: Economic Trends and Outlook. U. S. Department of Commerce - National
Trade Data Bank. June 1998. Available [Online]: <http://web.nps.navy.mil/
-reloonev/ Thailand 3.htm> [Dec. 1998].
The Financial Times. Timetable: Countdown to crisis. Jan. 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/3041_32.htm> [Dec. 1998].
The Military Balance 1996/1997. The International Institute for Strategic Studies.
(London: Oxford University, 1996).
The Ministry of Finance. The Letter of Intent Number Six. Dec. 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://www.mof. go.th/loi6/ loi6mainE.htm> [5 Jan. 1999].
The Royal Thai Government. Prime Minister Office: History. Jan. 1999. Available
[Online]: <http://www.thaigov.go.th/em-prime.htm> [Jan. 1999].
. Government Spokesman: 1999 Fiscal Budget Allocation. Available
[Online]: <http://www.spokesman.go.th.> [29 Dec. 1998].
Policy Statement. 20 Nov. 1997. Available [Online]: <http://www.
thaigov.go.th/em-pol.htm> [27 Dec. 1998].
Warr, Peter G., and Bhanupong Nidhiprabha. Thailand Macroeconomic Miracle: Stable
Adjustment and Sustained Growth. (Washington, D.C.: the World Bank, 1996).
World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer 1997. U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. Available [Online]: <http://www.acda.gov/wmeat97
/wmeat97.htm> [11 Mar. 1999].
World Fact Book 1997, Thailand: Economy, Available [Online]: <http://www.odci.




Defense Technical Information Center
8725 John J. Kingman Road, Ste 0944






Institute of Advanced Naval Studies
105 Mu 3 Salaya Road, Salaya
Puttamonton, Nakorn-Pathum 73170
THAILAND
4. Office of the Naval Attache.
Royal Thai Embassy.
1024 Wisconsin Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007








7. CDR Chonlathis Navanugraha
70/141 M. Chonlada Ram Intra 71







Defense Technical Information Center
8725 John J. Kingman Road, Ste 0944
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060-6218





Institute of Advanced Naval Studies
105 Mu 3 Salaya Road, Salaya
Puttamonton, Nakorn-Pathum 73170
THAILAND
Office of the Naval Attache.
Royal Thai Embassy.
1024 Wisconsin Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007









70/141 M. Chonlada Ram Intra 71
Ram Intra Road, Bangkok 10230
THAILAND
55


72 T31L7
G/02 22527-200 ^




